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INTERPRETATIONS 
OF A PHOTOGRAPHIC NARRATIVE 
BY VIEWERS IN FOUR AGE GROUPS 
PAUL MESSARIS 
LARRY GROSS 
A storyteller must be able to take for granted a certain 
amount of prior knowledge on the part of his audience. This 
prior knowledge usually pertains, ostensibly, to the real 
world (and not to that of fictional precedents and conven-
tions), even though in fact such knowledge may have been 
derived from fictional sources. Equally important, however, 
to the interpretation of a work. of fiction is the ability of the 
reader, listener, or viewer to discern which aspects of his 
prior knowledge are no longer valid within the confines of 
the special world which the storyteller erects before him. 
Lacking this ability, the viewer (or reader or listener) must be 
oblivious to all novelty, all nuance, and all deviation from 
stereotype. 
More generally, it appears possible to distinguish between 
interpretations which are governed by the audience-member's 
beliefs about the types of situations referred to in a fictional 
narrative and those interpretations which are grounded in the 
narrative's structure and aim to correspond to the presumed 
intentions of that structure's author. Following the termin-
ology of Worth and Gross (1974), who originally proposed 
this distinction, we shall refer to these two types of inter-
pretation as "attributional" and "inferential." According to 
this distinction, attribution involves the application of per-
sonal and social stereotypes to isolated events or series of 
events in a narrative. Textual context is not considered, nor 
are assumptions about the author's intentions taken into 
account. Conversely, inference deals with the relationships 
between textual elements and sees them as manifestations of 
the author's control and as vehicles of his intended meaning. 
Worth and Gross have suggested that inference presupposes 
attributional ability and that socialization entails a prog-
ression from the exclusive reliance on attribution to the 
capacity for complex inference. 
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The situation described in this report is one in which a 
simple conflict is created between a pervasive social stereo-
type and the implications of a brief fictional narrative. The 
stereotype in question is that doctors are always concerned 
with the welfare of others. Its violation involves a specific 
fictional doctor who, in the course of a picture-story about 
the end of his work-day, fails to help an accident victim he 
encounters on his way home. Thus, the evidence built into 
the narrative by its authors contradicts the assumptions with 
which certain viewers might be expected to approach this 
narrative. 
This report summarizes the results of a series of studies 
dealing with how viewers of various ages interpreted the 
narrative in question. The aims of these studies, and of this 
report, were: to provide data which would allow the descrip-
tion of apparent types of interpretational strategies; to com-
pare these types with those proposed by Worth and Gross; 
and, finally, to obtain some evidence on the extent to which 
there are age-related differences in the abi lity to use each of 
these strategies. 
The method used in these studies was to interview 
viewers, individually, on the meaning of a brief sequence of 
slides, which had been arranged into what the researchers 
considered to be story form. All the studies used the same 
sequence of 21 slides, as follows: 
(1, 2) The first two slides portray a young man in a white 
coat examining a bottle of amber liquid. The white coat, 
together with the background and the fact that the man has a 
stethoscope around his neck, are meant to suggest that the 
man is a doctor. 
(3, 4) Next, the man is seen conferring with a woman in 
nurse's uniform. In the second of this pair of slides, the man 
is putting on a sport coat, and the white doctor's coat is 
draped over the nurse's desk. 
(5) Here, the man is seen walking down what may be 
identified as a hospital corridor. 
(6, 7) In these two slides, the man is seen conferring ~ith 
a woman seated at a typewriter. He has an angry expression 
on his face, and, in the second of the two slides, he is seen 
dashing a piece of paper to the floor. The intention here, of 
course, was to portray ill-treatment of a secretary, and this 
episode was considered important for the purposes of the 
study, for reasons to be explained. 1 
(8) The man is now carrying a handbag (intended to rep-
resent a doctor's bag), and he is walking through an office 
area, presumably on his way home after having conferred 
with his secretary. 
(9, 1 0) He emerges from a doorway, above which is a sign 
which reads, "University of Pennsylvania Medical Center." 
(11) He is seen walking down a deserted street, next to a 
vacant lot. 
(12) In the foreground of this shot, a few yards ahead of 
the approaching doctor, is a car, which was intended to look 
as if it had just been in an accident. The hood is up, the door 
is open, and a hand can be seen hanging limply below the 
door. 
(13) A side view of the car reveals that a man is hanging 
out of the driver's seat. The doctor has stopped to examine 
the situation. 
(14) The doctor is still poised next to the car, looking at 
the accident victim. 
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(15) The doctor is shown continuing his walk down the 
street, with the car now in the background. 
(16, 17, 18) In a residential area now, the doctor is seen 
continuing his walk and arriving at an apartment building. 
(19, 20) Inside the building, he walks down a corridor and 
into the door of an apartment. 
(21) In the final slide of the series, the doctor is sitting on 
a couch with a young woman. They are both smiling broadly 
at each other, and she has a drink in her hands. 
Viewers were shown this sequence of slides after a min-
imal introduction, in which it was explained that, following 
the presentation, they would be asked to talk about what 
they had seen. This discussion took the form of a tape-recor-
ded, open-ended interview, arranged around the questions 
listed in Appendix A. Most of the questions were aimed at 
eliciting statements about what happened in the story, to-
gether with appraisals of its moral implications. In the fol-
lowing discussion of results, data will be drawn primarily 
from the following sources: (1) a study by Murphy (1973), 
comprising a sample of 12 children from each of 3 grades: 
grade 2 (approximate mean age 8 years), grade 5 (approx-
imate mean age 11 years), and grade 8 (approximate mean 
age 14 years); (2) a study by Harlan (1972), from which the 
relevant sample contained 5 second-graders and 5 fifth-
graders; and (3) a set of 16 interviews with college students 
(ages 17 and above) by Michael Pallenik. Additional material 
is drawn from interviews (some with younger children) by 
Gross and Messaris. 
The sequence of questions in Appendix A was not always 
adhered to strictly in all the interviews. Rather, the interview 
schedule was used primarily as a check-list of points to be 
covered in each interview. Because of our interest in inter-
pretational strategies, the more important questions for our 
purposes are the ones dealing with the reasoning behind an 
interviewee's response. These questions, which usually took 
the form of the "How do you know?" or "How can you 
tell?" indicated on the question-list, provided us with the 
information necessary to distinguish among the types of in-
terpretational strategies used by the interviewees. 
In this respect, the interviewees' handling of question 3 
Slide 3 
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Slide 73 
Slide 7 5 
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("What do you know about the man in the story?" etc.) is 
must instructive. We will begin our discussion of the data 
with this question, which was intended, first of all, as a check 
on whether or not the viewer had indeed identified the 
story's protagonist as a doctor. This was, of course, a crucial 
aspect of the story's intended meaning. As it turned out, 
almost none of the viewers, regardless of age, had any trouble 
identifying the "doctor" as such. The sole exception was a 
Slide 74 
Slide 7 6 
Slide 78 
second-grader who said that the protagonist was either a 
doctor or a scientist. (A small number of the older viewers 
identified the man as a "medical student," a category which 
the younger children may not have yet.) For our purposes, 
then, the answers to the question on the protagonist's iden-
tity were practically uniform. Their explanations, however, 
for identifying the man as a doctor were varied. 
Consider, for example, the difference between the first 
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two and the third of the following three responses: 
Q. What do you know about the man in the story? 
A. That he was a doctor. 
Q. How could you tell? 
A. He had a thing that you check your heart-you make med-
icine-needles-and he wore a white suit like other doctors do. 
(2nd grade) 
Q. What do you know about the man in the story? 
A. I think that he was a doctor. 
Q. How could you tell? 
A. First of all, he was going to give someone a needle, and usually 
people who don't have a profession like that don't give people 
needles. And he was looking at records and things, and he came 
out of the medical center. (5th grade) 
Q. OK, how do you know it's a physician? 
A. Ah, obviously the work at the beginning, the doctor's coat, the 
stethoscope ... the surroundings and of course the, ah, sign 
saying that it was a medical center ... so it implies that it's 
medically related and he's in the medical field. (college student) 
In the last of these three examples, a catalog of cues is 
held to "imply" that the protagonist is a "physician" or, 
more generally, "in the medical field." The crucial aspect of 
this response, which differentiates it from the other two, is 
precisely this explicit recognition of implication: of a pur-
poseful concatenation of elements meant to convey a certain 
meaning. In the responses of the second- and fifth-graders, 
there is no such acknowledgment of intentionality. All three 
responses contain enumerations of relevant cues (e.g., the 
white coat, the stethoscope, the medical center, and the 
imagined needle), but both of the younger viewers identify 
these cues with the typical behavior of doctors ("usually 
people ... don't give needles"; "like other doctors do"), 
rather than, as in the third case, the deliberate choice by an 
author. 
This general difference between modes of interpretive 
reasoning is the core of what we have described as the 
attribution-inference distinction. Equally clear instances of 
this distinction arose in the viewers' responses to the other 
"identification" questions in the interviews. With respect to 
question 5, for example, regarding "the lady the man was 
Slide 20 
Slide 27 
tal king to at work," compare the following responses. 
Q. How did you know that that woman was a nurse? 
A. Well, the things that she wore. Nurses always wear those bands 
around their head. (2nd grade) 
Q. Who was the lady at the beginning of the series of pictures? 
A. Looked like some kind of nurse. 
Q. How do you know? 
A. Well. .. she was in the hospital, she was wearing a white uni-
form ... that would sort of imply that she was a nurse. (college 
student) 
Once again, the distinction here is between the xplicit 
reference to implication in the latter example and the ub-
sumption under the typical ("nurses always wear ... ") in the 
former. Note that the responses which we have put forth 
here as examples of inference all appear to share with the 
attributional responses a sense of the existence of a stereo-
type. In this regard, the difference between them consists 
only in the fact that the inferential responses posit an auth-
orial, implicational use of the stereotype in question. Thus, 
as Worth and Gross have assumed, it can be said that infer-
ence "builds upon" attribution. 
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One thing which is not made clear in these examples, 
however, is whether there is any difference between the type 
of stereotype referred to. It is possible, but not necessary, to 
assume that attributional responses refer to stereotypes 
thought to hold for the "real" world, whereas inferential 
responses refer to fictional stereotypes. Lacking specific 
evidence, neither assumption is safe, because a "real-
fictional" distinction may not exist for "attributional" 
respondents, and it is quite plausible that an inferential 
response may assume the deliberate use of a "real-life'' 
stereotype. On the other hand, there are instances in our data 
when it is quite clear that an attributional response is refer-
ring to an aspect of the informant 's real-life experience. This 
was particularly true of viewers with parents in the medical 
professions, as in the following case: 
A. Sh e must have been a nurse. 
Q. How could you tell that? 
A. Because doctors always go to see nurses when they see some-
thing .... I know, because my daddy's a doctor, and so is my 
mommy-she's a nurse. {2nd grade) 
This example points to another aspect typical of many of 
the attributional responses, especially among the younger 
viewers: The request to justify a statement seems to be taken 
as a call to establish one's credentials as a real-life familiar of 
the type of situation at hand. These responses, in other 
words, appear to be attempts to establish the respondent's 
competence to identify the stereotype under consideration; 
the respondent must establish that he/s he has had the real-
life experience necessary to recognize a particular stereotype. 
Another example of this occurs in the following case, in 
which the respondent took question 5 to be a reference to 
the secretary, rather than the nurse. 
Q. Who was the lady the man was talking to at work? 
A. I think it was a secretary. 
Q. How cou ld you tell that? 
A. 'Cause she was typing and she had a big cabinet with papers in 
it. 'Cause I went to my friend's father's doctor's office and I 
went to see the secretary and the secretary had a typewriter and 
she had a cabinet full of papers. {2nd grade) 
The inferential respondent, on the other hand, is more con-
cerned with establishing that he has properly accounted for 
all the cues in the story itself. 
I'm not even sure he was a doctor ... now I'm making all these 
assumptions ... just what I could tell by the pictures. (college 
student) 
I have very little idea what type of person he is ... we're just, I 
mean you're inferring, I'm inferring from these pictures. (college 
student) 
Naturally, not all responses can be clearly labeled as 
attributional or inferential, nor is it always the case that a 
response is uniformly consistent with one or the other of 
these hypothetical strategies. One of Murphy's fifth-graders, 
for example, says at one point: "He was supposed to be a 
doctor, I guess, because he went to the 'terian' (Presbyterian) 
Medical Center at the University of Pennsylvania." This 
initial, apparently inferential response is followed, however, 
by a fairly extended consideration of the probability that a 
person of a certain age would be a doctor. 
He looked like he was about 23 or so, and when you go to college, 
you graduate from your four years of college, and then you'll be 
twenty-one, and then you have to take as many years- sometimes 
seven, sometimes three ... it depends what kind of doctor you 
want to be. And it would be kind of young to be a doctor. I think 
he was an intern or a student or something. 
Because this segment of the viewer's response is concerned 
exclusively with the real-life contingencies of a medical stu-
dent's attaining doctorhood by a certain age, we would clas-
sify it as attributional. It is possible, of course, to imagine an 
"inferential" respondent thinking in these terms, but it seems 
to us unlikely that an inferential respondent would actually 
expect, from the storyteller, such an extreme degree of ad-
herence to the dictates of realism. In other words, it seems 
likely that an experienced viewer would overlook the relative 
youth of the "doctor," ascribing it to the lack of an older 
actor. (Instead of assuming that the storyteller must have 
meant to represent a medical student because of the actor's 
youth.) 
The attributional respondent's inability to identify those 
aspects of the story for which the storyteller is not account-
able is typical of a more general tendency observed among 
our "attributional" respondents: the tendency to concern 
oneself with events outside the narration, things about the 
characters and their lives which the storyteller has purposely 
omitted to create, since they were not essential to his story. 
This tendency was very much in evidence in some viewers' 
responses to the first part of question 6, concerning the 
identity of the woman at the end of the story. Here many 
viewers were unclear as to whether this woman was the 
doctor's wife or girlfriend. In most cases, the tentative 
respon~e to this question was that the woman was the doc-
tor's wife. In the following inferential response, for example, 
a deli berate I y-created (but vague) aura of domesticity is 
credited with this impression. 
A. It was ... his wife. 
Q. How do you know? 
A. just ... he looked like a married man .... Don't ask me what a 
married man looks like. 
Q. All right, what does a married man look like? 
A. No ... it just looks like, ah, the typical story of a man going 
walking home from work to house ... and I expected the kids 
and the dog to come running in afterward ... it just seemed ... 
it was posed that way. {college student) 
The most typical reason for claiming that the woman was 
the doctor's wife was that he seemed to have his own key for 
the apartment. 
Q. How do you know that was his wife? 
A. You could tell because he was going into his house. He just 
opened the door .... He didn't knock or anything. {fifth grade) 
However, there were also many responses in which elaborate 
conjectures were made about the plausible range of relation-
ships between the doctor and the woman, as in the following 
example, in which-admittedly after some leading ques-
tioning- the respondent gives a rather complex set of reasons 
for his initial statement that the woman could be the wife of 
a sick friend. 
Q. And how about the lady at the end of the story? 
A. The one he was at the house with? 
Q. Who do you think she was? 
A. A friend. Maybe he was calling to talk to her about her husband 
or something. You know, he might be in the hospital. 
Q. What would indicate that she was probably a friend of his. 
A. Well they were laughing ... she had a drink in her hand, 
think .... 
Q. Is it possible she could have been somebody else? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Who? 
A. Maybe his sister, or an aunt or a cousin. Not an aunt-a cousin: 
they looked kind of like the same age. 
Q. Is it possible that that could have been his wife? 
A. Yes, maybe he doesn't wear a wedding ring. Some people don't 
do that. 
Q. Is it possible that could have been his girlfriend? 
A. Yes. If she's that kind of woman .... 
Q. Was she married? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Oh. 
A. That's why I say, if she's that kind of woman .... 
Q. I see. (eighth grade) 
The important characteristic of this response is that the 
respondent is creating for the doctor a background over and 
above anything specifically mentioned in the story or which 
the story might reasonably be expected to call for. In a 
similar vein, the respondent who argues that "she should 
have been in old jeans or something, but maybe the wife had 
to go out shopping or something" (fifth grade) is inventing a 
reality for these characters which goes beyond that explicitly 
demanded by the story. The same goes for the respondent 
who speculates on whether the couple had dinner after the 
story was over: 
Q. How could you tell that was his wife? 
A. Because she was in probably his house, and she probably got 
something for him to eat, and things like that. (second grade) 
The critical "error," in all these cases, is not so much the 
assumption that the characters in the story lead lives beyond 
what the storyteller has explicitly presented. Indeed, it can 
be argued that the storyteller depends, for his effect, on the 
viewer's assuming that the characters have a past, which will, 
in turn, influence the effects of the story's events on their 
future. What is inappropriate, however, is the implicit 
assumption that it is valid to speculate seriously on the par-
ticulars of this background. Admittedly, this speculation was 
in all cases initiated by the interviewer's question. Still, the 
interviewee could always have responded, as in the following 
example, that: "whether it's his wife or his girlfriend or 
whatever is irrelevant ... I guess to the main theme." (college 
student) As we shall see below, this whole issue is of critical 
importance to our viewers' interpretations of the doctor's 
behavior at the accident-site. 
The most striking aspect of the data was the viewers' 
handling of the accident in their initial account of the story 
(question 1) and in the course of subsequent probing (es-
pecially questions 7, 8, and 9). The younger the viewer in our 
overall sample, the greater was the probability that he/she 
would not report that the doctor had ignored the accident 
victim. Among the college students (N = 16), only one failed 
to make such a statement at any point in the interview. The 
corresponding figure for the eighth-graders (N = 12) was, 
again, only one. However, 35% of the fifth-graders (N = 17) 
and the majority, i.e., 65%, of the second-graders (N = 17) 
failed, in one way or another, to confirm what had been 
intended as the crucial event in the story, i.e., the doctor's 
failure to help an injured man. 
How, then, did the younger children deal with that seg-
ment of the story in which the accident was portrayed? 
Responses ranged from claims that the doctor actually had 
helped the accident victim to denials that there had been an 
accident or that the victim was present in the car. In the 
following case, for example, the informant, a second-grader, 
has just said that the most important thing in the whole story 
is "to go to the doctor": 
Q. So, what part of the story made you think that? 
A. When the man got hurt and he needed a doctor. 
Q. What did the doctor do then? 
A. Helped him. 
Q. He did? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How do you know that he helped him? 
A. I saw him. 
Q. What did he do? 
A. I don't remember. 
The emphatic tone of the above respondent, both in his 
assertion that he saw the doctor help and in his claim of lack 
of memory on the details, is actually rather atypical of this 
kind of answer. Much more frequently, respondents who did 
not report that the doctor had ignored the accident victim 
were either somewhat vague about what he had done, as in 
the example below, or, even more frequently, offered rather 
elaborate alternative versions of the story, as in the example 
following that. 
A. He helped the guy that was hurt in the car. 
Q. He did? I see. What did he do to help him? 
A. Um. He I think gave him bandages. 
Q. Gave him bandages. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Anything else? 
A. No. (second grade) 
Q. Why did he act the way he did at the accident? 
A. Well, cause he kinda had an expression that he really felt sorry 
for the person and he knew that he was very lucky to be alive 
'cause he looked as though he was thinking about the person 
that was in it. 
Q. Do you think he did the right thing? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why do you think so? 
A. 'Cause he thought about other people not himself, and some 
nonthoughtful people would say, "Oh, poor guy," and just walk 
off, but the expression on his face looked as if he was saying, 
thinking that he was lucky to be alive and not be hurt or any-
thing. 
Q. What did he do after he saw that? 
A. He crossed the street. 
Q. Did he do anything about the accident? 
A. No, he had an expression on his face, but there wasn't much to 
do about it, 'cause he couldn't have done anything 'cause if the 
person was in it he would have probably called an ambulance. 
Q. There wasn't anybody in the car? 
A. No. (fifth grade) 
Thus, not only is the doctor exculpated, but the whole 
incident is actually transformed into a demonstration of his 
compassion. What could account for instances such as these, 
in which the viewers appear so obtusely to misinterpret the 
central event of the story? As we have suggested in the intro-
duction to this report, the explanation, we believe, lies in the 
kind of belief expressed in the penultimate statement of the 
viewer in the above example ("he would have probably called 
an ambulance"). There is every reason to believe that the 
viewers- especially, perhaps, the younger ones- had strong e -
pectations that the doctor would help the accident victim in 
the story. Aside from the generally very positive image of 
doctors on which, as the reader will see, many viewers in is-
ted, there is concrete evidence on this point in some sup-
plementary data in Murphy's {1973) study: Eight "control 
subjects," who were given a verbal description of the 
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accident scene and asked to predict the doctor's response, all 
predicted that he would help ; and a poll of 38 college stu-
dents on the relative likelihood that people of a variety of 
occupations would help an accident victim had doctors in the 
"most likely" category, together with policemen and clergy-
men (Murphy 1973:44). A plausible explanation, then, for 
the frequent assertions that the doctor did help the accident 
victim or that no help was needed is that the viewers in 
question were reconciling their interpretations of the story 
with their prior beliefs about doctors. 
Because in this case authorial implication is so contrary to 
the evidently prevalent social stereotype, the respondents 
who were swayed by the stereotype offer us some of the 
clearest possible examples of the nature of what we have 
called attributional reasoning. One aspect of this, as pointed 
out above, is the assumption of a reality independent of the 
way in which the storyteller has structured it, so that the 
narrative becomes subject to the addition of details absent 
from the text. In our data, cases of this sort involved claims 
that events had occurred "between shots" or that other cir-
cumstances, not present in the pictures, accounted for the 
doctor's behavior. 
Q. What was the most important thing in the story? 
A. When he called the ambulance about the killed man. 
Q .... What did you see that showed you that he called the am-
bulance when he came to the accident? 
A. Well, after one picture the man was not in the car any more. He 
must have been in the hospital. {fifth grade) 
A. While he was walking down the road, he saw this guy in the 
car-l didn't know really what he was doing. The guy was laying 
in his car with the door open, and the trunk was open. 
Q. What could possibly be going on - or what could have been 
going on - in that situation? 
A. Well, that guy in the car-he could have had to stop to do 
something to his engine or something, and then he walked up 
there to do something, and he needed a screwdriver, and he 
went back in his car and he was getting it-and he was real tired 
and he fell asleep in the seat. (fifth grade) 
Q. Was the man who took these pictures a good storyteller? 
A. No. 
Q. Why not? 
A. Because that guy could have helped the man in the car and he 
didn't show it. {eighth grade) 
You know, they didn't show everything-all the parts to it. Like 
what he did ... if he just walked away from the guy, or if they 
missed it ... missed a shot. ... (eighth grade) 
Other cases of this sort are summarized by Murphy as fol-
lows: 
No help was needed because the doctor saw that the man was 
repairing his car- there had not been an accident .... Doctor took 
the victim back to the hospital in between shots .... The doctor 
went home to the nurse to tell her about the accident so that help 
could be called .... The doctor was blind so that he couldn't see 
the accident victim .... The doctor's help was not needed because 
an ambulance had already been called .... The story was about 
two men who looked alike {first man was a doctor, second was 
not). Existence of second man postulated because respondent 
could not believe that a doctor would ignore an accident victim as 
shown .... [Murphy 1973 :58; all respondents second graders] 
These statements may be contrasted with the following 
examples (all from interviews with college students), in 
which the assumption that one's interpretation is bounded 
by the authorially-chosen sequence is clearly spelled out. 
Q. How do you know that he didn't go and get help? 
A. Well this ... I'm presuming that the pictures you showed me 
show a continuous story ... and that nothing important was left 
out ... that would have been important ... specially since they 
spent so much detail showing him walking home. 
Q. What else could he have done? 
A. Well the main thing ... first of all he could've ... I think he 
could've ... tried to ... some sort of help ... for the person ... 
or called the police or something. I'm assuming though that this 
is what he did and that these are sequential pictures. 
Q. How do you know? {after question about the story) 
A .... the sequence of pictures is such that there's no shot of him 
calling, no shot of him calling for any help. 
Q. And how do you know he did what you say he did? 
A. That he did ... ah, I mean the series of shots: he saw the 
accident, took a look at the victim hanging out the door ... and 
the following sequence, just leaving the scene. 
A distinction critical to the Worth-Gross model of inter-
pretational competence and useful in the present context is 
that between sequence and structure. ((Sequence" may be 
thought of as the relationship between contiguous story-
elements; structure as the set of interrelationships among all 
the elements of a story. For Worth and Gross, the ability to 
base an interpretation on aspects of a story's structure (i.e., 
on the relationship among non-contiguous story-elements) 
marks the highest level of interpretational competence, to be 
distinguished from the level of sequence-based interpretation. 
Two portions of the doctor story were explicitly designed 
to test the ability of viewers to handle structure: slide 6 and 
7, in which the doctor is shown in a fit of anger, and slide 21, 
which concludes the story with a picture of the doctor cheer-
fully chatting with a young woman. Both of these story-
elements were meant to corroborate the implications of the 
doctor's behavior at the accident scene. Thus, the doctor's 
explosive uncouthness with his secretary could be seen as a 
harbinger of his even more egregious behavior at the accident 
scene (and, at the same time, as a possible reason for this 
behavior : he had had a rough day at the office and was in a 
foul mood); while the absence of any sign of remorse amid 
the frivolity of the final scene could be taken as the ultimate 
confirmation of the doctor's callousness. (One could assume, 
too, at the end, that the doctor had just told the woman 
about the accident and that this was the source of their 
merriment; but none of our viewers appeared inclined to 
ascribe such a degree of perverseness to either character.) 
The instances, in the data, of cases in which either of the 
above structural relationships was cited are very few. 
Furthermore, in no case did a respondent explicitly refer to 
these structural relationships as manifestations of an author-
ial design. Thus, the doctor's wrath at his secretary was taken 
not as a deliberate hint, by the author, at what was to come, 
but only as a possible explanation of the doctor's unwilling-
ness to be bothered with the accident victim. The following 
two examples of such interpretations are by a fifth-grader 
and a college student, respectively. 
Q. Why do you think the man in the story acted the way he did? 
A. Well maybe he had a lot of patients that day and was tired and 
his secretary did something wrong and got him madder so when 
he was walking by the car he didn't want any more work that 
one day so he just walked by. 
Q. Why do you think the man acted the way he did? 
A. Ah ... he probably was angry at work because of the picture 
right before that where he threw something down, because 
something wasn't right. When he left the hospital he was prob-
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ably angry or upset or disgruntled or something ... and that 
probably took over his logical reasoning so he probably walked 
by the guy and probably said well I'm not in the mood. 
Mention of authorial intentions is similarly absent from 
the next two examples, in which the doctor's mirth at the 
end of the story is taken as confirmation of his callousness. 
Note that in both cases the concluding episode is judged to 
be the second most important thing in the story (after the 
accident). The first quotation is from a fifth-grade interview; 
the second from that of an eighth-grader. 
Q. What else was important in the story? 
A. That he didn't tell anybody about it. 
Q. How could you tell that? 
A. Because, well, his wife or girlfriend would act a bit different. 
Like if she heard it ... her smile - she was smiling all the time 
when she was talking to him - and I think when she would have 
heard it her smile would have left her face, or some other ex-
pression would have come on it. 
Q. What else was important in the story? 
A. Well, he didn't even think that much about it. He went home 
and had fun. 
It should be mentioned here that the viewer from whose 
interview the above quotation came did subsequently talk 
about the storyteller's intentions regarding the final scene. 
However, this happened only after the interview had moved 
to its last stage, in which the issues of ficticity and inten-
tionality were introduced into the questions. Thus, the infor-
mant having said that the man who took the pictures was a 
good storyteller, the interviewer then asked him what the 
story would have been like if told by a bad storyteller: 
A. Well , he might not have shown the man having a friendly 
evening ... so you wouldn't know if he'd ignored it. 
Q. Having what? 
A. You wouldn't know if he'd ignored it like he did, or if he was 
still thinking about it. 
This is also one of the very few instances in the data in 
which a viewer gives evidence of having considered the 
options available to the storyteller (in this case, whether to 
include the final scene or not}. The ability to empathize with 
an author's decision-making can be considered a prerequisite 
for sophisticated interpretation; and, in this regard, it is sig-
nificant that no informant raised this issue before the last 
part of the interview. 
In concluding this discussion of how viewers treated the 
relationship between the story's ending and the accident 
scene, we should also mention the use, by some of the 
respondents, of the final scene as an explanation of the doc-
tor's behavior. These viewers suggested that the doctor might 
have been in a hurry to get home to his wife/girlfriend, either 
because of a special occasion, or for some other reason. As 
the following example indicates, such an interpretation is not 
necessarily even an implicit structural inference. 
Q. Why do you think the man in the story acted the way he did? 
A. Cause he liked her and he didn't want her to worry. He didn't 
want her to call the police cause they would come and get him 
and well .... 
Q. What? 
A. She would get worried and she would send out the police and 
he didn't want them to do that. 
Q. I see. How do you know that? 
A. That almost happened to me. {fifth grade) 
The only instance in our data in which a viewer took the 
aftermath of the accident scene as a comment, by the author, 
on the doctor's emotional reaction dealt not with the closing 
slide but with a previous shot (19) of the doctor in a hallway 
inside his apartment building. 
and then he got home and the one picture showed him ... {in-
comprehensible) ... getting out of the elevator thing, or walking 
down the hall. Looks like it's sort of blurred ... so maybe ... 
trying to show ... caution, maybe he's questioning what he did or 
didn't do. (college student) 
This example is of particular interest because it shows the 
dependence of inferential reasoning on a prior attribution of 
skill to the author. In other words, the use of any aspect of a 
narrative as evidence for an interpretation must depend on an 
implicit or explicit assumption that the author was in fact in 
control of that aspect of the story and was capable of making 
it serve his intentions. The shot referred to by the respondent 
above is in fact somewhat blurred. But the soft focus is due 
entirely to poor lighting, which the photographer could not 
control (and which forced the use of a large lens-opening). 
However, in basing an inference on this shot, the viewer in 
the above example is obviously taking the lack of focus to be 
deliberate and crediting the photographer with the ability to 
control it. (Incidentally, this example also illustrates the 
possibility that accurate interpretation may occasionally 
require technical expertise. The difficulty of getting sharp 
color slides in dimly-lit hallways would probably not have 
escaped the attention of a skilled photographer.) 
Another instance, in the doctor story, in which inference 
was fairly obviously predicated on an assumption of ad-
equate authorial control is the accident sequence itself. 
Those viewers who cited the sequence as evidence for the 
inference that the doctor didn't he I p must also have assumed 
that the sequence was an adequate reflection of the author's 
intentions (i.e., that it had not been botched in production 
or tampered with after the fact). 
I'm assuming that th e photographs follow a logical sequence of 
events. (college students) 
I'm presuming that the pictures you showed me show a continuous 
story ... and that nothing really important was left out. (college 
student) 
You could have left out a whole sequence of pictures where he 
went over and tried to help the person in the car, but I d idn ' t see 
that so I didn 't have that impression. {college student) 
To the paucity of "structural" inferences in our data we 
may contrast the abundance of attributional responses based 
on apparently quite commonplace social stereotypes. This 
was particularly true of the viewers' handling of three ques-
tions designed to test the presence of inferential reasoning, 
namely, questions 7 ("Why do you think the man in the 
story acted the way he did?"), 4 ("Do you like the man in 
the story?"), and 2 ("What was the most important thing in 
the story?"). We have already explained the structural ram-
ifications of question 7: the earlier scene with the secretary 
and the final scene with the wife/girlfriend could both be 
taken as intentional clues to the doctor 's personality. The 
other two questions, which we will discuss presently, are 
clearly ways of finding out about a viewer's ability to deal 
with structure as a whole: this is required not only in order 
to be able to select the most important feature of a structure 
but also in order to be able to extract an overall meaning 
from it (i.e., is the doctor, on the whole, likeable?) . 
Before discussing questions 2 and 4, a further note should 
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be added on question 7. As we have already indicated and as 
we shall see further below, many of the age-related differ-
ences in our data conform to a scheme of increasing inter-
pretational sophistication such as that proposed by Worth 
and Gross: namely, a movement from reliance on social 
stereotypes to consideration of authorial design. The answers 
to question 7, however, are a striking instance of a different 
pattern. Here, the movement in our sample is not from 
attribution to inference but from one social stereotype to 
another, and the overall trend can be seen as one of in-
creasing cynicism with age rather than an increase in inter-
pretational competence. Thus, the younger viewers' faith in 
the benevolence of doctors is supplanted not by a realization 
that this stereotype was being intentionally exploited in the 
story, but by a different, less cheerful, stereotype. The 
following two examples are both from interviews with 
eighth-graders and are typical of many responses in this age-
group. 
Q. Why do you think the man in the story acted the way he did? 
A. Scared he would be sued. It's happened before, like when a 
couple of years ago we were talking about this in sixth grade, 
some guy was beat up and thrown down the stairs and was 
killed. People just walked right by him and didn't care. Maybe 
somebody could've helped him and they did something 
wrong-like put a tourniquet on his arm-and he could have to 
have it amp.uta~ed, he could sue the person. 
Q. Why do you think the man in the story acted the way he did? 
A. Well, if you're a doctor and you stop to help somebody-if they 
die or lose ... have something amputated or something, they 
can sue you·. So ' a lot of doctors don't stop for an accident 
because they might get sued. 
The responden~ in.·the example below was a college student. 
Q. Why do you think he acted the way he did? 
A. Well, you're sorta taught not to get involved. Doctors specifi-
cally ... I don't think ... would get involved with an accident, 
you know, where. they weren't given charge. 
Q. Why? 
A. Well, he can get sued. 
Unlike question 7, questions 2 and 4 gave rise to trends 
which appear to us to be clearly related to increasing inter-
pretational competence. Question 4 ("Did you like the 
man?") may be examined in relationship to what we have 
already said about the interpretations of the accident 
sequence. We have suggested that the younger children failed 
to report the doctor's "undoctorly" accident-site behavior 
because of an inability to relinquish belief in a positive image 
of doctors. The answers to question 4 confirm the previous 
evidence that it is only after the fifth grade that this positive 
image can confidently be expected to succumb to the im-
plications of the slide sequence. Of the second-graders 
(N = 17), 94% said that they did like the doctor. The corres-
ponding figure was 53% for the fifth-graders (N = 17), 8% for 
the eighth-graders (N = 12), and 12% for the college students 
(N = 16). This trend is even more dramatic than the one 
observed on the issue of whether the doctor did help or not. 
Characteristic of the attributional responses of the 
younger children is the fact that the number of children who 
said they liked the doctor is greater than the number who did 
not say he had ignored the accident victim. In other words, 
liking was not necessarily predicated on his behavior at the 
accident. This is precisely what one would expect of an 
attributional response, in which prior beliefs, and not the 
internal structure of a narrative, determine interpretation. 
The following examples are arranged by age, the youngest 
being that of a preschooler, and the oldest that of a fifth-
grader. 
Q. How can you tell he's a nice man? 
A. Because he helps people to get well . 
Q. How do you know he helps people to get well? 
A. Because he's a doctor. 
Q. And that's what doctors do? Did you see him help people get 
well in the pictures? 
A. I just know. 
Q. I see. 
A. We went to the doctor when .... my mommy ... we went up to 
the lake, and she went waterskiing, she let go and she hurt her 
legs ... you should have seen it. 
Q. And the doctor helped her? I see. That's fine. 
Q. Did you like the man? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why? 
A. He takes after my father. (Her father is a doctor.) 
Q. Do you like the man in the story? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why? 
A. Well, he seemed like a person that was friendly, he had a good 
occupation ... 
Q. Well, was there anything thllt made you dislike him? 
A. No. 
As the figures for the two older age groups indicate, their 
evaluations of the doctor were overwhelmingly negative, in 
conformance with the intended meaning of the story. This is 
not to say, however, that intentionality was explicitly men-
tioned in these responses. 
Q. Do you like the man in the story? 
A. No, not really. 
Q. Why not? 
A. Because he didn't like help that guy like in the car, he just 
stared at him for a while and then he just went right by ... he 
didn't do anything. (eighth-grader) 
Unlike the questions we have discussed thus far, question 
2 ("What was the most important thing in the story?") can 
be seen as an implicit, although weak, reference to the 
presence of a central design behind the story. As such, it 
serves as a bridge for the brief discussion, below, of questions 
11 and 12, in which the issue was broached directly. Because 
of its implicitness, however, question 2 is more interesting 
than the other two. 
The viewers' responses to question 2 exhibited an age-
related trend similar to the one we have presented on ques-
tion 4 and on the issue of whether the doctor ignored the 
victim or not. 71% of the second-graders (N = 17) did not 
cite the accident as the most important part of the story. For 
the fifth-graders (N = 17), the corresponding figure was 29%, 
and it was 17% and 12% for the eighth-graders (N = 12) and 
college students (N = 16), respectively. This trend can be 
explained, in part, by referring to the younger children's 
failure to report that the doctor had not helped at the 
accident. For those youngsters who did not see the accident 
as such, or did not think there had been a victim, a response 
such as the following, by a second-grader, is perhaps predic-
table. 
Q. What do you think was the most important thing in the story? 
A. I think he was gonna give a needle to somebody or cause they 
were sick or something. 
Q. How could you tell that? 
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A. Cause I saw him. He had a needle in his hand, and he had this 
little jar that he was going to stick the needle in. 
Q. OK, is there anything else that's important in the story? 
A. I don't know. 
The more interesting aspect of the data, however, and, in 
our opinion, the more convincing reason for the observed 
trend, is what these data reveal about the viewers' under-
standing of the word "important." For the older viewers, 
importance appears to rest on centrality to the story itself, 
i.e., an important part is one that is crucial to the story's 
main point. For the younger viewers, however, importance 
appears to be measured not in terms of the story but in terms 
of "life" in general. Thus, an important event is one of deep 
human significance, rather than one which contributes much 
to the story's message. 
Q. What was the most important thing in the story? 
A. He was helping somebody by giving that person a shot, so that 
he can't get sick. He can work and get enough money so that he 
can support a family. 
Q. Why was that the most important thing? 
A. Because he had a wife and people have to buy food to live. 
Q. What else is important? 
A. He liked helping people so they can't get sick. {second grade) 
Q. OK, what was the most important thing in the story? 
A. I think it was those chemicals. 
Q. Why was that the most important thing? 
A. I don't know, but it would make medicine. 
Q. What else was important in the story? 
A. I don't know. {second grade) 
Q. What was the most important thing in the story? 
A .... I guess to make the medicine to make people well. 
Q. Why was that the most important thing in the story? 
A. That more people would live. 
Q. What else was important in the story? 
A. I guess the nurse showed him the paper to make more medicine. 
Q. Why was that important? 
A. To make more people well. (second grade) 2 
We should point out, incidentally, that this notion of "im-
portance" is not inconsistent with claiming that the accident 
was the most important part of the story. In the example 
below, such a response is justified by reference to the poten-
tial seriousness of an accident's results. 
Q. What was the most important thing that happened in the story? 
A. I think it was when that car crashed. 
Q. Why? 
A. Because it was more dangerous, you can get hurt in a car, or it 
can blow up or turn over, it could be on fire, and you couldn't 
get anyone to get you out. (second grade) 
To these cases may be contrasted the following example 
of an eighth-·grade response, in which it is clear that contri-
bution to the story-line, rather than general social signifi-
cance, is the criterion of importance, and the example after 
that, from a college student's interview, in which the acci-
dent is seen as the explicit focal point of an entire implica-
tional structure. 
Q. What was the most important thing in the story? 
A. I guess it was walking home. 
Q. Why would that be? I mean what happened? 
A. He came across the guy in the car-the guy was just laying there. 
Q. Why was that important? 
A. Well, it showed that he didn't want to get involved. 
Q. What's the most important thing in the story? 
A. The accident. 
Q. Why? 
A. Because that's what most of the pictures are on and ... it's also 
the only thing that seems to hold the thing together. 
Q. How do you mean? 
A. It's the-it's what everybody should focus on because obviously 
his work at the office isn't that important ... well, the whole 
point of it would be that he saw this accident and he passed it 
by ... and he ... your reactions to that. 
Q. Why isn't his work in the office that important? 
A. Ahm ... because nothing is really shown. 
The final two clusters of questions will concern us only 
briefly, because, by asking openly about intentionality, 
meaning, etc., they raise a different order of issues from the 
one discussed thus far. With respect to question 12, regarding 
the quality of the storyteller, we will confine ourselves to 
noting that, aside from considerations of technical expertise, 
clarity of presentation, and interest of subject matter, an 
additional criterion which occurred with some frequency 
among the responses of the younger viewers was that of im-
portance or morality of subject matter. 
Q. Was the man who took these pictures a good storyteller? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why would you say so? 
A. Cause he put in important things that were good. 
Q. Any other reasons? 
A. No. {second grade) 
As for the second part of this question, on the author's inten-
tions, we should note only that there was a predictable ten-
dency on the part of the younger viewers to cite a moralistic 
message ("That you should help other people"-second 
grade) as the author's intention, whereas older viewers were 
more inclined to either cynicism or a statement such as: 
"That the doctor wasn't such a nice guy." (fifth grade) 
Finally, we come to question 11, concerning the "reality" 
of the pictures. Considering the type of analytic scheme 
which we have applied to our data, the importance of this 
question should be evident. It was meant as the ultimate 
probe of the viewer's awareness of the intentionality behind 
the story. However, because the term "real" was left open to 
the viewer's definition, the criteria of reality were not always 
the same. Specifically, a large proportion of the second- and 
fifth-graders took "real" to mean "not a drawing," at least 
initially. More interestingly, it was found that, when infor-
mants were uniformly thinking in terms of stages vs. candid 
events, the criterion for making the determination was also 
age-related. The youngest viewers (second grade) were over-
whelmingly inclined to consider plausibility as the criterion 
of candidness, as in the following examples, the first of 
which refers to the doctor's outburst of anger. 
Q. What about these pictures? Do you think they're real? 
A. No. 
Q. Why do you think that? 
A. Because a man wouldn't do that to a book. (second grade) 
Q. OK, what about these pictures, do you think they're real? 
A. Sometimes. 
Q. Which ones do you think are real? 
A. When the doctor gets the medicine and talks to the nurse and 
when the doctor walks home. 
Q. Why do you think they are real? 
A. Because the doctor does walk home. 
Q. How do you know that? 
A. Cause my uncle is a doctor and he does it himself. 
Q .... How can you tell where there is a fake picture? 
A. A fake picture would be when the doctor would not care for 
anything. {second grade) 
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It appears from these examples that these viewers are not 
troubled by the question of how the pictures could have 
been obtained if the events had been real. Only one of the 34 
second- or fifth-grade viewers raised this issue. On the other 
hand, this was the most frequent criterion of reality for the 
older viewer. It is important to note, also, that for these 
viewers it was primarily the unlikelihood of a candid series 
that determined their judgment. 
Q. Any other indications that they were or were not real? 
A. Well, a guy's going to think there's something wrong when every 
minute a guy pops in front of him and takes a picture. Like he 
was never looking down when they took the pictures; he was 
looking straight. (eighth grade) 
A. Each one of these pictures separately ... mmm, not so much the 
ones with the guy in the car, but, the other pictures separately, 
could possibly be candid shots, but taken as a whole, as a 
series ... r don't think they could possibly be. (college student) 
This age-related difference in criteria of reality may be 
taken as a capsule illustration of the central distinction be-
tween attributional and inferential interpretational strategies, 
to which distinction we now return, in order to summarize 
briefly the most important points made thus far. According 
to Worth and Gross, the governing difference between at-
tribution and inference lies in the type of reasoning which is 
used to support interpretations in each case. Attributional 
interpretations treat the events in a fictional narrative as 
though they were subject to the rules of the real world. 
Consequently, attributional interpretations of these events 
are justified by appeal to the interpreter's beliefs about real-
ity. Inferential interpretations, on the other hand, are 
grounded in the interpreter's assumptions concerning the 
author's intentions, since inference entails a presupposition 
that the narrative is a deliberately implicational construction. 
In the data presented in this report, clear cases of this aspect 
of the attribution-inference distinction occur in connection 
with questions 3 ("What do you know about the man in the 
story?") and 5 ("Who was the lady the man was tal king to at 
work?"). In both instances, attributional responses were 
supported by reference to the characteristic appearance, 
behavior, or working environment of real-life doctors, nurses, 
or secretaries. Moreover, such responses were occasional! y 
further justified by explicit accounts of the sources of the 
viewers' information on these aspects of reality (e.g., "I 
know, because my daddy's a doctor, and so is my mommy-
she's a nurse."). In both instances, again, the accuracy of 
inferential responses was taken by viewers to depend on an 
adequate decipherment of the author's intentions; and, in a 
small number of cases, the obligation to confine one's evi-
dence to the "text" was made explicit (e.g., "I'm making all 
these assumptions ... just what I could tell by the pictures"). 
The responses to questions 3 and 5 also serve to illustrate 
another aspect of the relationship between attribution and 
inference. Worth and Gross assume that inferential reasoning 
presupposes attributional "fluency," i.e., that inference 
makes use of part of the apparatus of attribution. This 
dependence of inference on attribution is characteristic of 
the strategies used by viewers to identify the "man in the 
story" and the "lady the man was tal king to at work." 
Attributional and inferential responses alike made use of sets 
of stereotypical properties of doctors, nurses, or secretaries; 
but, in the inferential responses, these properties were 
treated as deliberate fabrications. In this sense, then, infer-
ence is a more complex interpretational strategy than attri-
bution. (Inference is also the more complex strategy by vir-
tue of its ability to handle structural relationships in a 
narrative, rather than assigning stereotypical interpretations 
independently of sequence or structure. However, the data in 
this report contain almost no instances of "structural" infer-
ences and only a small number of cases of inferences based 
on sequence.) 
A corollary aspect of the attribution-inference relation-
ship, according to Worth and Gross, is that inferential skills 
are learned later than attributional ones. The point is 
demonstrated most clearly, in this report, by the viewers' 
interpretations of the doctor's behavior at the scene of the 
accident. The large percentages of younger viewers (65% of 
the second-graders and 35% of the fifth-graders) who did not 
report that the doctor had ignored the accident victim are 
indicative of the primacy of the "good doctor" stereotype, in 
the interpretational reasoning of these viewers, and of the 
concomitant lack of a sense of obligation to conform to an 
authorial implication. No such tendency was found among 
the older viewers, who, almost without exception, did not 
fail to report that the doctor had not helped. These findings 
are strengthened by similar age-related trends in the viewers' 
responses to questions 4 ("Do you like the man in the 
story?") and 2 ("What was the most important thing in the 
story?"). In both instances, attributional reasoning on the 
part of the younger viewers appears to have exaggerated the 
applicability of the positive doctor-stereotype to this par-
ticular doctor, so that the majority of these viewers said that 
they liked the doctor and that the initial hospital sequence, 
rather than the episode at the accident site, was the most 
important thing in the story. Once again, no such tendency 
was observed among the older viewers. 
The findings summarized above have implications in a 
number of areas. With regard to the nature of the inter-
pretation itself (as distinct from its mode of justification), we 
would expect the results of the interpretation to be relatively 
independent of the type of interpretational strategy used, if 
the narrative belongs to one of the more convention-bound 
forms, such as television drama. We would expect consider-
able differences in interpretation between attribution and 
inference, together with considerable "incomprehension" on 
the part of attributional viewers, in the presence of narratives 
with a relative absence of strongly conventional components. 
And, as in the case of the narrative dealt with in this report, 
we would expect contradictory interpretations in cases in-
volving the juxtaposition of a familiar stereotype and an 
authorial "comment" thereon. Among the viewers who used 
to object to television programs like "All in the Family," for 
example, were those who were responding to a stereotype, 
rather than to its ostensibly ironical treatment by the writer 
or the producer. 
With regard to the aesthetic aspects of the experience of 
viewing (or listening to, or reading) a story, the attribution-
inference distinction would lead us to expect the following. 
On the part of an "inferential" viewer, we would expect an 
awareness of the author's control during the course of the 
narration and, as a result of this awareness, a potential 
response to whatever skill is manifested in that control. We 
would argue-as Gross (1973) has argued elsewhere- that this 
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vicarious participation in the skillful performance of another 
is precisely what constitutes an aesthetic experience. Unlike 
the hypothetical "inferential" viewer, a "pure attributional" 
viewer would not be expected to be aware of the author's 
implied presence, and such a viewer should therefore be un-
involved with the author's display of skill. (Instead, we 
would expect the "attributional" viewer to be a vicarious 
participant in the events depicted in the narrative.} Con-
sequently, we would claim that a "pure attributional" viewer 
cannot, by definition, have an aesthetic experience (as a 
member of the audience of a fictional narrative}. It is pos-
sible that this accounts for the considerable number of cases 
in our data in which younger viewers, when asked to evaluate 
the storyteller (question 12), did so in terms of morality 
rather than of skill. 
Finally, a brief word of caution should be added on the 
issue of whether and how a storytelling medium such as 
television may contribute to its audience's beliefs about the 
real world. Since "attributional" respondents operate on an 
implicit assumption of continuity between the world of a 
fictional narrative and the real world, it may seem reasonable 
to speculate that such respondents are more susceptible to 
having their notions about the real world shaped by fiction. 
Conversely, an inferential viewer's awareness of authorial 
control should, perhaps, create a resistance to such influence. 
Furthermore, extrapolating from the findings of the present 
report, it could be argued that attributional viewers are much 
more susceptible to the reinforcement of stereotype than to 
the assimilation of novelty. Because, as this report has in-
dicated, younger viewers tend to be attributional in their 
approach to fiction, such speculation becomes particularly 
intriguing. Therefore, it must be pointed out that there is no 
evidence for any of these three points in the data. 
NOTES 
1 1n an alternative version of this pair of slides, the conference with 
the secretary is conducted without the angry exchange. The use of 
this version with some of Murphy's interviewees did not generate any 
discernible differences in viewers' responses to the remainder of the 
stori.. 
The fact that the hospital scenes mentioned in these responses 
occur at the very beginning of the story raises the possibility that 
there is also a "primacy effect" operating here , for the younger 
viewers. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
(1} What was the story told in the pictures? How do you know ? 
(2) What was the most important thing in the story ? Why ? What else 
was important in the story? 
(3} What do you know about the man in the story ? How can you 
tell? What else do you know about the man in t he story ? How 
can you tell? 
(4} Do you like the man in the story? Why ? What made you like 
him? Why? What made you dislike him? Why ? 
(5) Who was the lady the man was talking to at work ? How do you 
know? What were they talking about? Who was to blame for th e 
mistake? How do you kn:Jw? 
(6} Who was the lady at the end of the story? How do you know ? 
Did you like the lady? What made you like her? Did you dislik e 
the lady? What made you dislike her? 
(7) Why do you think the man in the story acted th e way he did ? 
Why do you think so ? 
(8} Do you think that was the right thing? Why was that the right 
(wrong) thing to do ? 
(9) What else could he have done? What would you have done? What 
would another person have done in that situation ? How do you 
know? 
(1 0) Is there anything else about the story that you rem ember whi ch 
we did not discuss? 
(11) What about these pictures? Do you think they are real ? How do 
you know? How do you think they got th ese pictu res? How do 
you know? 
(12) Would you say that the person who took these pictures was a 
good storyteller? What was he trying to make you think ? How 
do you know ? What was the meaning of the story? 
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